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 A B S T R A C T  
Various problems regarding the distribution of revolving funds at the Ministry of 
Cooperatives and SMEs have prompted the government to transfer its management 
through LPDB-KUMKM (Revolving Fund Management Institution for Cooperatives 
and MSMEs) for the sake of financial accountability and professionalism. Several 
improvements have been made, among others, through collateral and service rates that 
have never been applied before. The service rate was applied first, with a value lower 
than the bank interest rate. This study examines the impact of collateral and service 
rates on the loan default rates. This study uses data of loan developments of LPDB-
KUMKM partners from the beginning to 2018. The Logit Regression Model is used 
to support the analysis. This study's results indicate that collateral has a negative 
correlation with the growth in loan default rates. This study's results are expected to 
be taken into consideration by the government in regulating financing needs, 
especially regarding collateral and service rates, so that the accessibility of MSMEs 
to obtain financing from LPDB-KUMKM will increase. 
 
 A B S T R A K  
Berbagai masalah penyaluran dana bergulir Kementerian Koperasi dan UKM 
mendorong pemerintah untuk mengalihkan pengelolaannya melalui LPDB-KUMKM 
demi terwujudnya akuntabilitas pembiayaan dan profesionalisme. Upaya perbaikan 
telah dil-akukan, antara lain, melalui penerapan agunan dan tarif layanan, yang 
sebelumnya hal tersebut tidak diberlakukan. Tarif layanan lebih dahulu diterapkan, 
namun nilainya lebih rendah dari pada suku bunga perbankan. Penelitian ini mengkaji 
pengaruh dari agunan dan tarif layanan terhadap tingkat gagal bayar pinjaman. Studi 
ini menggunakan data berupa perkembangan pinjaman mitra LPDB-KUMKM dari 
awal hingga tahun 2018. Model Regresi Logit digunakan untuk mendukung analisis. 
Hasil studi menunjukkan bahwa agunan memiliki korelasi negatif terhadap 
pertumbuhan tingkat gagal bayar pinjaman. Hasil penelitian ini diharapkan bisa 
menjadi pertimbangan pemerintah dalam mengatur persyaratan pembiayaan, terutama 
terkait alternatif agunan dan opsi tarif layanan, agar aksesibiltas pembiayaan UMKM 




Micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) have 
an important contribution to economic development 
in every country, including Indonesia. The role of 
MSMEs is not only for poverty alleviation but also 
for economic equality. Besides, MSMEs have a 
significant contribution to state income or foreign 
exchange. After the 1997-1998 economic crisis, the 
number of MSMEs increased and was even able to 
create employment opportunities as much as 97% 
(114 million) of the total available employment 
(Ministry of Cooperatives and MSMEs, 2013). 
On the other hand, MSMEs have also faced 
various obstacles, such as limited capital and 
technology, absence of financial reports, lack of 
managerial and marketing capabilities, and capital 
difficulties. Concerning capital, limited access to 
banks or financial institutions, and the lack of 
financial institutions are the main problems. 
MSMEs' limitations in accessing funding sources are 
caused by the inability to provide collateral and a 
lack of good administration related to their business 
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activities to be considered not bankable (Beck & 
Demirguc-Kunt, 2006; Daskalakis, 2013; Liang et al., 
2017). 
The government is obliged to provide financing 
for MSMEs. Many MSME development programs 
have been launched, including poverty alleviation 
programs, such as Farm Business Loans (KUT), Food 
and Energy Security Loans (KKPE), Small 
Investment Loans (KIK), Fixed Working Capital 
Loans (KMKP), and Revolving Fund Program. 
However, most of these programs are not successful, 
except for the Revolving Fund Program, which is 
still running and is expected to be successful and 
sustainable (Aziz & Wicaksono, 2017). 
The Revolving Fund Program that began in 
2000 was originally a capital strengthening program 
from the government (Ministry of Cooperatives and 
SMEs, 2013) provided to cooperatives and MSMEs 
without interest and collateral. However, several 
problems emerged in its development, such as 
unmeasured performance, low productivity of 
revolving funds, and biased revolving fund 
management standards. Various agencies channeled 
these funds with various types of expenditure. The 
accounting and reporting for revolving funds did 
not follow State Financial Management and 
Government Accounting Standards (SAP) 
principles. This is in accordance with the findings in 
a study conducted by Abe et al. (2015) that 
policymakers can improve conditions by acting as 
facilitators and communicators. The government 
should not provide direct financing whenever 
possible. 
Minister of Finance Regulation (PMK) Number 
99 / PMK.05 / 2008, concerning revolving funds, 
has changed the management of revolving funds 
from the Ministries / Institutions to the Work Units 
(Satker) by applying the Public Service Agency 
(BLU) Financial Management pattern. The Ministry 
of Cooperatives and MSMEs established Revolving 
Fund Management Institution for Cooperatives and 
MSMEs (LPDB-KUMKM) to channel 
loans/financing to Government Accounting 
Standards-based cooperatives and MSMEs so that 
they can run effectively, on target, and with the right 
benefits. Besides, revolving funds are expected to 
impact the economy, both locally and nationally, 
significantly (Trisnojuwono et al., 2018).  
According to Mahjabeen (2010), financial 
institutions, such as banks, aim to optimize 
managed portfolio allocation. In other words, in 
lending, financial institutions have specifically 
provided credit distribution to MSME groups by 
rationalizing special loans. However, various 
empirical studies on microfinance conducted in 
various developing countries prove that asymmetric 
information and MSME resources have an 
important role in MSME financing or credit success. 
Asymmetric information between lenders and 
borrowers drives the risk of default. In this case, the 
lenders find it difficult to observe every detail of the 
agent's (borrower's) activities, which can only be 
observed through reported financial performance 
(Castillo, Mora-Valencia, & Perote, 2018). 
LPDB-KUMKM has perfected the revolving 
fund regulation by applying collateral and charging 
service rates to improve service quality and 
professionalism. The policy aims to minimize risk. 
However, on the other hand, most SMEs do not have 
collateral as a loan requirement. Duarte et al. (2017) 
stated that borrowers' "lazy" behavior increases 
when banks ask for collateral not to mitigate 
observable risks but to reduce screening efforts. This 
study aims to determine whether collateral and 
service rates (interest rates) impact the default rate 
by LPDB-KUMKM partners. 
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HY-
POTHESES 
The provision of credit or loans is intended to drive 
the community's economy and absorb labor, which 
in turn can improve the welfare of the community. 
However, banks' granting of credit to entrepreneurs 
and the public, especially those running MSMEs, 
always has a very high risk. Therefore, in granting 
credit, banks must apply sound credit principles 
(Caprio et al., 2010). 
Some researchers in theoretical studies, 
including Bester (1987), Boot et al. (1991), and Stulz 
and Johnson (1985), suggest that the use of loan 
securities such as collateral, within the scope of 
asymmetric information, leads to the possibility of 
obtaining welfare benefits by limiting adverse 
choices and moral hazard problems. Regarding 
collateral use to mitigate the borrower's moral 
hazard, Boot et al. (1991) argue that collateral 
encourages borrowers to exert greater management 
effort to reduce the likelihood of default. Gama and 
Duarte (2015) argue that collateral reduces the bad 
incentive for borrowers to choose risky projects. 
This type of effect can be captured by observing 
the ex-post performance of borrowers who 
guarantee collateral. Despite many empirical studies 
of collateral use, however, little attention has been 
given to the collateral effect on borrowing 
companies' ex-post performance. Most empirical 
studies of collateral examine the relationship 
between ex-ante borrower risk and collateral supply 
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and find that risky borrowers will more often 
guaranteed by collateral (Berger and Udell, 1990; 
Berger et al., 2011; Brick and Palia, 2007; Orgler, 
1970). However, Jiménez and Saurina (2004) find 
that loans provided to borrowers with collateral are 
more likely to be non-performing loans than loans 
provided to unsecured borrowers simply because 
borrowers with collateral are riskier ex-ante (i.e., 
when loans are given). Most of the previous 
literature does not deal with the possibility of 
selection bias and, as such, cannot discuss whether 
collateral reduces the ex-post borrower's moral 
hazard behavior. 
The results of research conducted by Comeig et 
al. (2015) show that the guarantee and interest rate 
contribute significantly to loan repayments' success. 
However, the collateral guaranteed is stronger on a 
second loan, not only after the defaults but also after 
the loan is successfully repaid. Research conducted 
by Castillo (2018) discusses SMEs' failure to capture 
the collateral's moral hazard effects. Related to the 
relationship between the borrower and the lender, 
the borrower is in asymmetric information. 
The results of various studies show that 
guarantees can function as contractual tools to 
improve lender screening and monitor incentives. 
Besides, collateral is also effective in increasing bank 
seniority in the presence of several creditors and 
increasing its screening and monitoring because 
collateral serves as an instrument for lenders' 
production of information. Some banks with a low 
level of MSME loan analysis expertise use collateral 
as a substitute for poor evaluation skills. Most of the 
studies mentioned above are related to the role of 
collateral for SME accessibility opportunities for 
formal financing. Some of the research results are 
also relevant to the condition in Indonesia. There are 
various models of SME financing in the world. Some 
use the government budget (APBN), and others use 
private financing. However, all these studies 
analyze SME financing by banks, both government 
and private. The Government of Indonesia founded 
LPDB-KUMKM to provide capital for MSMEs with 
difficulty accessing financing from banks. As a 
preventive measure in suppressing the high number 
of defaults, LPDB-KUMKM has set a policy in the 
form of an obligation for its partners to provide a 
loan guarantee. 
 
3. RESEARCH METHOD 
This study aims to determine whether applying 
collateral as a loan requirement affects MSME 
financing access and partner loan repayment. For 
this purpose, the analysis used is Logistic 
Regression. The logit model is a non-linear 
regression model where the dependent variable is 
categorical. The logit model's most basic category 
produces binary values, such as the numbers 0 and 
1, so it is often called binary logit. If the category is 
more than 2, the ordinal logit regression or 
multinomial logit is used. 
Ordinal logistic regression is one of the 
regression methods used to find the relationship 
between the response variables, nominal or ordinal 
scale, and one or more continuous or categorical 
explanatory variables. The estimation of 
multinomial and ordinal logistic regression models' 
parameters is done using the Maximum Likelihood 
Estimation method (Sari et al., 2013). The logit model 
makes probabilities dependent on the observed 
variables, namely X1, X2, and so on. This estimation 
aims to find the best value for each coefficient 
(Kuncoro, 2004). The logistic regression model used 
is as follows: 
 
Ldefault = α + β1 Collaterali + β2 Interesti + β3 Compi + 
β4 Plafoni + β5 Asseti + β6 Tenori  + β7 Legali 
 
Ldefault is the LPDB-KUMKM partner default 
rate (0 = collectability of current loans, 1 = 
collectability of bad loans or defaults). α,β is 
regression coefficient. Collateral is the value of the 
collateral used as a requirement of the loan 
application (for partners who do not use collateral, 
the collateral value is 0). Interest is the service rate 
(interest rate) for a loan (1 = 4% interest, 2 = 4.5% 
interest, 3 = 5% interest, 4 = 6% interest). Comp is the 
type of partner company (0 = cooperative, 1 = 
Strategic SME). Plafon is the ceiling or the value of 
partner loans (in Million IDR). Asset is the value of 
total assets owned by partners (in Millions of 
Rupiah). Tenor is the repayment period (1 = 24 
months, 2 = 36 months, 3 = 48 months, 4 = 60 months, 
5 = 72 months), Legal is the partner’s legal business 
entity ownership (0 = does not have a legal entity, 1 
= has a legal entity). 
 
4. DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
This research was conducted by observing reports 
on the development of LPDB-KUMKM partners’ 
loans from the beginning to 2018. This study's data 
are secondary data, which provide information 
regarding partner profiles and everything related to 
loan terms and conditions. 
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Table 1. Characteristics of LPDB-KUMKM Partner 
Source: LPDB-KUMKM, 2018, processed 
 
From a total of 3,805 partners, consisting of 
banks, venture capital companies, savings and loan 
cooperatives, the real sector, and strategic SMEs, 
there are only 811 sample units. Seven hundred 
eighty-nine units are from strategic sector SMEs, 
while the remaining 22 units are from real sector 
cooperatives. The samples used in this study use 
loans directly, or in other words, as end-users.  
This study's dependent variable is credit quality, 
divided into 2 (two) categories, namely default and 
paid off. The level of bad credit is commonly called 
the amount of non-performing loans (NPL). A high 
NPL value can cause major shocks to the economic 
system of a country, especially the monetary sector, 
such as banking (Hossain & Chowdhury, 2015). 
In this study, the explanatory variable is the 
default rate. The researchers use the policy indicator 
variable. The first variable is the use of collateral or 
the application of collateral policy as a loan 
requirement, which then becomes a dummy variable, 
where partners who do not use collateral as a 
condition for obtaining a loan are coded 0, while 
partners who use collateral are coded 1. The second 
variable is the service rate or commonly referred to as 
the interest rate. In providing financing, LPDB-
KUMKM applies various service rates based on the 
SME business sector being carried out. In this study, 
partners were divided into four categories based on 
the rates charged: 4.5%, 5%, 5.5%, and 6%. 
Apart from the variables that explain the policy 
as described above, several control variables explain 
the partner's condition as a determinant of default, 
including the type of company, the amount of the 
loan, the ratio of total loans per asset, the term of the 






Sum % Sum % 
1 Company Cooperative 12 1.48 10 1.23 
   Small Medium Enterprises 715 88.16 74 9.12 
2 Loan Amount < IDR 300 Million 661 81.50 6 0.74 
   IDR 300 Million – IDR 2 Billion 55 6.78 62 7.64 
  > IDR 2 Billion 11 1.36 16 1.97 
3 Asset < IDR 1 Billion 671 82.74 15 1.85 
   IDR 1 Billion – IDR 10 Billion 45 5.55 56 6.91 
   > IDR 10 Billion 11 1.36 13 1.60 
4 Tenor 24 Month 1 0.12 1 0.12 
   36 Month 30 3.70 37 4.56 
   48 Month 7 0.86 18 2.22 
  60 Month 689 84.96 25 3.08 
  72 Month 0 0.00 3 0.37 
5 Interest Rate 4 % 6 0.74 3 0.37 
   4,5 % 680 83.85 18 2.22 
   5 % 9 1.11 11 1.36 
  6% 32 3.95 52 6.41 
6 Legal Entity Having a Legal Entity  252 31.07 72 8.88 
   Not having Legal Entity 475 58.57 12 1.48 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of the Variables 
Variable 
Descriptive Statistics 
Mean Mode Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Loan Size (in billion IDR) 0.42 0.11 1.1 0.11 13.00 
Asset Value (in billion IDR) 2.68 0.13 15.99 0.12 222.15 
Tenor (Month) 57.75 60.00 6.84 24.00 72.00 
Legal Entity Ownership 0.40 0.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Interest Rate (% per year) 5.34 5.00 0.64 4.00 6.00 
Use of Collateral 0.83 1.00 0.37 0.00 1.00 
Source: LPDB-KUMKM 2018 reports processed 
 
Table 2 shows that the highest loan value is IDR 
13 billion, while the lowest is IDR 110 million. The 
average loan value is IDR 420 million with a standard 
deviation of IDR 1.1 billion. The largest asset value is 
IDR 222 billion, and the smallest is IDR 120 million. 
The average asset size is quite high, or IDR 2.68 
billion, with a standard deviation of IDR 15.99 billion. 
The shortest loan term is 24 months, and the longest 
is 72 months. The loan term chosen by most partners 
is 60 months, with a standard deviation of 6.84 
months. Meanwhile, based on the mode's value, the 
most frequent number that appears is 0, so more 
partners do not have legal entities. The highest service 
rate value is 6% per year, while the lowest is 4% per 
year. The service rate most preferred by partners is 
5% per year, with a standard deviation of 0.64. 
Finally, based on the value of the mode, which is 1, it 
can be concluded that more partners use collateral as 
a condition for the loan. 
Based on data presented in Table 2, the majority 
of LPDB-KUMKM debtors have current status in 
credit payments. Eighty-four debtors (10.35%) have a 
bad status, where ten debtors are from cooperatives 
(1.23%) and 74 debtors (9.12%) are from SMEs. This 
indicates an uneven distribution between current and 
problematic debtors in credit payments. Partners 
whose loan value below IDR 300 million with current 
status are 661 (81.50%) and those with bad status are 
6 (0.74%). Partners whose loan value ranging from 
IDR 300 million to IDR 2 billion with current status 
are 55 (6.78%) and those with default status are 62 
(7.64%). Partners whose loan value more than IDR 2 
billion with current status are 11 (1.68%), and those 
with default status are 16 (1.97%). 
In terms of the asset value, partners with total 
asset value under IDR 1 billion with current status are 
671 (82.74%), and those with bad status are 15 (1.85%). 
Partners whose total asset value ranging from IDR 1 
to 10 billion with current status are 45 (5.55%), and 
those with bad status are 56 (6.91%). Partners whose 
total asset value more than IDR 10 billion with current 
status are 11 (1.36%), and those with bad status are 13 
(1.60%). Related to financing period (tenor), a partner 
whose financing period of 24 months with a current 
status is 1 (0.12%) and that with bad status is 1 
(0.12%). Partners whose financing period of 36 
months with current status are 30 (3.70%) and those 
with bad status are 37 (4.56%). Partners whose 
financing period of 48 months with current status are 
7 (0.86%) and those with bad status are 18 (2.22%). 
Partners whose financing period of 60 months with 
current status are 689 (84.96%), and those with bad 
status are 25 (3.08%). Meanwhile, all partners whose 
financing period of 72 months has a bad status, or 3 
(0.37%). Based on the ownership of legal entities, it 
can be seen that partners who have a legal entity with 
current status are 252 (31.07%), and those with bad 
status are 72 (8.88%). Partners who do not have a legal 
entity with current status are 475 (58.57%), and those 
with NPL status are 12 (1.48%). 
The strategic sector SMEs and the real sector 
cooperatives get service rates of 4%, 4.5%, 5%, and 6% 
based on the service rates. Based on the table, it can 
be seen that partners whose service rate of 4% with 
current status are 6 (0.74%) and those with bad status 
are 3 (0.37%). Partners whose service rate of 4.5% with 
current status are 680 (83.85%), and those with bad 
status are 18 (2.22%). Partners whose service rate of 
5% with current status are 9 (1.11%) and those with 
bad status are 11 (1.36%). Partners whose service rate 
of 6% with current status are 32 (3.95%), and those 
with bad status are 52 (6.41%). 
 
Empirical Result 
The regression results using STATA Software show 
the output with error coefficient, z (z-score for the test 
β = 0), p> | Z | (p-value, for z test). A positive slope 
indicates that any increase in the independent 
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variable will increase the possibility of default. 
Conversely, a negative slope indicates that any 
increase in the independent variable will reduce the 
possibility of default. The slope mark as the STATA 
output shows that the sign is negative and significant 
on the collateral variable, indicating that partners 
who use collateral as the condition for a loan have a 
greater chance of reducing the repayment rate of bad 
loans. However, according to Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache (2002), some collaterals can be seen as a 
put option. Moral hazard still cannot be eliminated 
because shareholders and managers get incentives 
when taking high risks because there is collateral to 
replace money borrowed by customers. Bank 
shareholders have the freedom to exercise this option. 
In this case, the shareholder executes it when the 
borrower cannot return the credit. 
The term of the loan has a positive slope on the 
coefficient and is significant. It can be interpreted that 
partners with longer loan terms tend to minimize the 
chance of default on loans. In other words, shorter 
loan terms tend to increase partner lending 
opportunities to default. As Anderson (2003) stated, 
there is a need to set limits and tolerate banking risks. 
Setting limits will provide maximum certainty for 
risk-takers and limited opportunities for loans to 
default. 
The existence of a legal entity also has a positive 
and statistically significant slope. This means that 
partners who have legal entities have greater 
opportunities for bad loans. In other words, partners 
who do not have legal entities have greater 
opportunities to repay their loans. This fact is quite 
interesting because it is contrary to what was stated 
by Barth (2007) that legal entity reporting is a useful 
tool in understanding the current entity structure 
(organization) and the objectives of each entity. This 
provides a starting point for analyzing the feasibility 
and capacity of the entity.  
 
Table 3. Marginal Effect Estimation Results 
Variable 
Bad Loans 
dy/dx Standard Error 
Use of Collateral -0.0392*** 0.0158 
Interest Rate 0.0355*** 0.0096 
Tenor -0.0309*** 0.0087 
Legal Entity Ownership 0.0387*** 0.0141 
Typical of company -0.0228 0.0234 
Loan Amount 0.0001** 0.0000 
Asset 0.0000 0.0000 
 
The results of this study indicate that the number 
of MSMEs with legal entities is only a few. Osano  and 
Languitone (2016) state that there is a relationship 
between awareness of legal entity ownership by 
SMEs and access to finance. These findings also show 
the importance of the government's role in facilitating 
the requirements and management of SMEs' legal 
entities to improve access to finance. The existence of 
a legal entity needs to be examined further. There is a 
possibility that a legal entity is only to boost the status 
of MSMEs to get larger loans, but this is not matched 
by the capacity of the businesses they have. As shown 
in Table 4.1, the proportion of non-performing loans 
is in the credit category of IDR 300 million – IDR 2 
billion and > IDR 2 billion. 
Partners who have collateral tend to reduce the 
chance of default by 3.9 times than those without 
collateral. Partners tend to experience bad credit 
when the interest rate they receive increases by 3.25%. 
Partners' likelihood to experience default will 
decrease 3.09 times if the loan term is increased or 
more than one year/12 months. A legal entity's 
existence encourages partners to be in default 3.87 
times compared to those who have no legal entity. 
These results indicate asymmetric information where 
partners who have legal entities tend to have good 
loan quality. Meanwhile, the loan ceiling contributes 
to the partner to have a chance of loss when the asset 
value is almost the same as the total loan or ceiling 
received. 
 
5. CONCLUSION, IMPLICATION, 
SUGGESTION, AND LIMITATIONS 
In 2014, LPDB-KUMKM began implementing the 
use of collateral as a condition for obtaining loans to 
potential partners to mitigate and anticipate an 
increase in Non-Performing Loans (NPL). The 
empirical evidence presented in this analysis shows 
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that collateral as a condition for obtaining a loan 
effectively reduces the level of partner financing 
default. The estimation results show that collateral 
as a condition for obtaining a loan and the loan term 
contributes to decreased bad credit. In contrast, the 
service rate (interest rate) and a legal entity's 
existence contribute to the increase in bad credit. 
Regarding legal entities, there is still asymmetric 
information on policies implemented by LPDB-
KUMKM, where partners that already have legal 
entities are expected to reduce the level of bad credit, 
but the fact is the opposite. Meanwhile, after 2014, 
the collateral system was implemented as a 
condition for obtaining loans, the number of new 
partners decreased every year. In other words, the 
application of collateral affects the accessibility of 
MSMEs to obtain financing from LPDB-KUMKM. 
Collateral contributes to reducing default. Some 
partners do not have assets, or their assets are 
insufficient to be used as collateral. Therefore, 
LPDB-KUMKM must find alternatives to help 
partners who have limited assets to be used as 
collateral. Meanwhile, the repayment period of the 
loan has a significant effect on minimizing defaults. 
More partners experience defaults than those that 
can repay, especially for tenors of 36 months and 48 
months. In this case, LPDB-KUMKM must be more 
observant in looking at its partners' business 
capacity and the plan to use their loans before 
determining the loan repayment period. 
Legal entities also contribute to defaults. This is 
none other than because there are still many MSMEs 
that do not have legal entities. Most of them only 
have business licenses. They have difficulty 
managing legal entities due to the lack of 
information they receive. The government needs to 
simplify the management of legal entities, for 
example, through Online Single Submission. 
Considering that the default rate dominated by 
partners with large loans, LPDB-KUMKM must be 
more careful in conducting a risk analysis of the 
proposed loan. Business capacity, business 
prospects, and the amount of capital held are 
important parts that must be considered. Besides, 
LPDB-KUMKM also needs to collaborate with Bank 
Indonesia and P.T. PEFINDO in order to be able to 
find out the loan history of the potential partners. 
The application of collateral as a requirement 
for obtaining a loan affects the accessibility of SME 
loans. An easy and flexible facility in submitting 
collateral needs to be considered. The facility 
includes providing alternative guarantees other 
than fixed assets, for example, in the form of 
personal guarantees, fiduciary receivables, cash 
guarantees, or insurance companies' assistance (PT 
Jamkrindo for the national level and PT. Jamkrida 
for the regional level). 
In this study, researchers have not been able to 
obtain data related to MSMEs' financial conditions, 
such as assets, turnover, and profit and loss, where 
these data also have the potential to affect the rate of 
loan default. The data cannot be obtained due to 
company policy. It is expected that further research 
obtains the data so that it can provide a broader 
picture of the factors that influence the occurrence of 
default and the level of accessibility of MSMEs to 
obtain financing from LPDB-KUMKM. 
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